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Showing posts with the label banks

A fractional reserve crisis

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This is a slightly amended version of a keynote speech I gave on 14th April 2023 at the University of Ghent, for the Workshop on Fintech 2023.  The crisis that has engulfed crypto in the last year is a crisis of fractional reserve banking. Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank NY were fractional reserve banks. So too were Celsius Network, Voyager, BlockFi, Babel Finance and FTX. And still standing are the crypto fractional reserve banks Coinbase, Gemini, Binance, Nexo, MakerDAO, Tether, Circle, and, I would argue, every one of the DeFi staking pools. All of these are doing some variety of fractional reserve banking. Custodia Bank and Kraken Finance claim to be full-reserve banks – but 100% reserve backing for deposits is both hard to prove and not a guarantee of safety. What do I mean by “fractional reserve banking”? My definition might surprise you. For me, fractional reserve banking simply means that the composition of a bank’s assets is less liquid than that of its liabilities....

What really happened to Signature Bank NY?

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  As the world reeled in shock at the sudden collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), another bank quietly went under. On Sunday 12th March, the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC announced that all SVB depositors, whether insured or not, would have access to their funds from Monday. And then they added:  We are also announcing a similar systemic risk exception for Signature Bank, New York, which was closed today by its state chartering authority. Signature Bank NY's state chartering authority was the New York State Department of Financial Services (NY DFS). It posted this on its website :  On Sunday, March 12, 2023, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) took possession of Signature Bank in order to protect depositors. All depositors will be made whole.  DFS has appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver, and the FDIC has transferred all of the deposits and substantially all of the assets of Signature Bank to Sig...

The Peston effect

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The last week or so has seen some of the worst bank communications since 2007, when the Bank of England started a bank run by leaking news of Northern Rock's emergency liquidity request to the journalist Robert Peston. Then as now, awful communications have frightened the horses, triggered stampedes and caused banks to fail. Three banks in particular have shown an extraordinary insensitivity to popular fears: Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse, and Wells Fargo. Two of these have paid a heavy price for their management's inept handling of vital communications. But the third seems to have got away with it - this time. Next time, it might not be so lucky.  Exhibit 1: Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) In the wake of Silvergate Bank's failure, Silicon Valley Bank decided to restructure its balance sheet.  SVB's full-year accounts released in February revealed that it was backing highly volatile uninsured deposits with long-dated government securities that were falling in value and,...

Silvergate Bank - a post mortem

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Silvergate Bank died yesterday. Its parent, Silvergate Capital Corporation, posted an obituary notice   (click for larger image): Silvergate Bank bled to death after announcing significant delay to its 10-K full-year accounts and warning that it might not be able to continue as a going concern. We will never know whether it could have recovered from the bank run after the failure of FTX. The bank run after the announcement was far, far worse. The exit of its major crypto customers sealed Silvergate's fate.  But the agent of death was a government agency. On 7th March, Bloomberg reported that Silvergate Bank had been in talks with FDIC about a potential resolution "since last week". Many of us had expected FDIC to go into the bank last Friday with a view to resolving it over the weekend. We now know that FDIC did indeed go into the bank, but a resolution over the weekend wasn't possible. Presumably, this means there was no buyer.  Why do I say there was no buyer? Beca...

Hollow Promises

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Today, I bring you the sad tale of a crypto lender that promised safety and high returns to its depositors, but whose promises have proved to be as hollow as its name.  Donut Inc., a self-proclaimed DeFi" lender, has a "Proof of Reserves" section on its website . This is supposed to reassure customers that their deposits are matched one for one by the platform's liquid assets. I am firmly of the opinion that "Proof of Reserves" statements prove nothing without a corresponding statement of liabilities, since deposits aren't the only form of liability, and encumbered assets can't back deposits. But in this case, the "Proof of Reserves" is worse than useless. It is actually fiction. And it conceals a truly dreadful situation for Donut's customers.   As of today, this is what the "Proof of Reserves" says:  By itself, this doesn't prove anything at all. It's just an unsupported statement of what the company calls "ass...

What was the real reason for the Bank of England's gilt market intervention?

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Why did the Bank of England intervene in the gilt market this week? The answer that has been doing the rounds is that it was protecting the solvency of pension funds. But this doesn't make sense to me. The Bank doesn't have any mandate to prevent pension funds going bust. And anyway, the type of pension fund that got into trouble isn't at meaningful risk of insolvency. There was never any risk to people's pensions.  I don't think the Bank was concerned about pension funds at all. I think it had a totally different type of financial institution in its sights.  Let's recap the sequence of events from a market perspective. This was, on the face of it, a classic market freeze. Pension funds sold assets, mainly long-dated gilts, to raise cash to meet margin calls on interest rate swaps (of which more shortly). The sudden influx of long gilts on to a market already spooked by an extremely foolish government policy announcement caused their price to crash. I am told th...

Why Celsius Network's depositors won't get their money back

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The crypto lender Celsius has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This should come as a surprise to absolutely no-one, though the grief and pain on Twitter and Reddit suggests that quite a few "Celsians" didn't want to believe what was staring them in the face. Celsius suspended withdrawals nearly a month ago. So far, every crypto lender that has suspended withdrawals has turned out to be insolvent. There was no reason to suppose that Celsius would be different.   Celsius's bankruptcy filing says the company has assets of $1 - 10 bn and a similar quantity of liabilities:  This doesn't tell us much about the extent of the company's insolvency. But rumours have been circulating of a $2bn hole in its balance sheet. In May,  according to Coindesk , the company said it had $12bn of what Celsius calls "customer assets" and Coindesk calls "assets under management", and $8bn lent out to clients. So "assets under management" seem to have fal...