Coppola Comment

This is the uncut version of the final chapter of my book, "The Case for People's Quantitative Easing". It was written May/June 2018, so is slightly out of date (though I have updated it in places). But I believe its conclusions are right. So I am publishing it now to coincide with COP 26.  I've also included an updated version of the original postcript of the book, which seems to me to be very relevant now - not least because the first part of the Dune epic has just been released! There is scientific consensus that climate change is radically changing the nature of the planet, with profound implications for the future of humanity and indeed for life on earth as we know it. Already, the effects are becoming apparent: ice caps are melting, sea levels are rising, global temperatures are the highest on record and the incidence of extreme weather events is increasing. According to the former Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, climate change threatens both fina...

Yesterday, someone who had been watching one of my (all too frequent) Twitter arguments about money made this comment:  The "unknown person with few followers" was my protagonist. And the blue tick "classical expert" was me. I am Goliath.  But ten years ago, I was David. Armed only with Blogger and Twitter, and my knowledge of banking and finance, I set out to slay the financial Philistines that rampaged across the internet in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. I published my first Coppola Comment post on 20th February, 2011. It throws slingshots at a media pundit who had written an article about short selling, on which he was far from expert. You can still read it , if you like.  My early posts were rough and ready, and my terminology is at times excruciatingly loose, but I was sure of my subject. I understood British banking and financial markets well, though I had left RBS nearly ten years before. It was evident to me that the 2008 financial crisis in th...

This post was sparked by conversations with people who have opposing views of how money creation works. Some people think that classical models such as IS-LM don't work with endogenous money theory, therefore the models need to be discarded: others think that there's nothing wrong with the model and the problem is endogenous money theory. Personally I think that simple models like IS-LM can be powerful tools to explain aspects of the working of a market economy, and it behooves us therefore to find ways of adapting them to work with an endogenous fiat money system. So this is my attempt to reconcile IS-LM with endogenous money. I don't claim that it is anything like the final word on the subject, so comments are welcome.  The IS-LM model looks like this: : where M is the quantity of money in circulation, L is the "liquidity preference" (the degree to which investors prefer to hold interest-bearing, less liquid assets rather than to zero-interest, highly liquid mon...

Yield curves have gone mad. Negative yields are everywhere, from AAA-rated government bonds to corporate junk . Most developed countries have inverted yield curves, and a fair few developing countries do too: (chart from worldgovernmentbonds.com) Negative yields and widespread yield curve inversion, particularly though not exclusively on safe assets. To (mis)quote a famous pink blog , this is nuts, but everyone is pretending there will be no crash. Here, for your enjoyment, is an à la carte selection of the most lunatic government yield curves. You can find lots more here . Exhibit 1: Switzerland. Negative yield already extends beyond 30 years, and markets are pricing in further interest rate cuts and/or QE, or indeed anything to stop the Swiss franc appreciating as scared investors pile into CHF-denominated assets. Hence the curve inversion. Exhibit 2: Denmark. Every Danish government bond currently circulating in the market is trading at a negative yield. And the in...

Last night, the Resolution Foundation hosted a debate to launch my book, "The Case for People's Quantitative Easing". A great panel consisting of Jagjit Chadha, Director of NIESR; Fran Boait, Executive Director of Positive Money; and James Smith, Research Director of the Resolution Foundation, debated my ideas with immense verve, ably moderated by Torsten Bell, Chief Executive of the Resolution Foundation. You can watch the debate here . In 2008, QE did a great job of supporting asset prices and preventing the disastrous deflationary spiral of the 1930s. But since then, enormous quantities of asset purchases by central banks around the world have proved unable to raise aggregate demand and kickstart growth. Although central banks didn't do a bad job in the last recession, many of the tools they used won't work in the next one, not least because the legacy of the tools themselves has not yet dissipated. Interest rates are on the floor, central bank balance sh...

No doubt you are all wondering why Coppola Comment has been quiet for the last two months. There are two reasons: the first is personal - my father is seriously ill and needs a lot of my time. But the second will I hope be music to your ears. I am writing a book. My forthcoming book will be called "The Case For People's QE" and will be published by Polity, probably in Spring 2019. Yes, I know, the title makes it sound as if I have gone over to the dark side. But I assure you I have not become a Corbynista. My version of "People's QE" has a long and hallowed pedigree, running all the way from Keynes through Friedman to Willem Buiter, John Muelbauer, Paul McCulley, Zoltan Poszar and numerous other sensible people. It's really the outcome of much of my thinking and writing over the last eight years. Coppola Comment will be back in due course. In the meantime, here is some music. Ice creams may be obtained from the kiosk in the foyer, and drinks are ...

In a speech in London the other day, Peter Praet discussed the ECB's unconventional policy measures. I was there, and I have to say that he deviated considerably - and rather entertainingly - from the version of the speech on the ECB website. But his core message was still the same: "Rates are expected to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. So, no interest rate hikes for a long time to come. But that's not what his final chart says: Market expectations are that interest rates will start to rise any day now. And no, this is not expectations of rate rises due to the end of QE, which the ECB has arguably signalled for early 2018 (or at least it didn't signal that it wouldn't end then). This is the short-term rate, which is not directly affected by QE. Admittedly, future expectations of short-term rates in 2018 and beyond are close to the ECB's own predictions. But is that b...

In a new paper *, Michael Woodford has reimagined the famous “Schroedinger’s Cat” thought experiment. I suspect this is unintentional. But that’s what happens when, in an understandable quest for simplicity, you create binary decisions in a complex probability-based structure. Schroedinger imagined a cat locked in a box in which there is a phial of poison. The probability of the cat being dead when the box is opened is less than 100% (since some cats are tough). So if p is the probability of the cat being dead, 1-p is the probability of it being alive. The problem is that until the box is opened, we do not know if the cat is alive or dead. In Schroedinger’s universe of probabilities, the cat is both “alive” and “dead” until the box is opened, when one of the possible outcomes is crystallised. Now for “cat”, read assets. In Woodford’s model, when there is no crisis, the probability of asset collapse is zero. But if there is a crisis, the probability of an asset collapse is grea...